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ABSTRACT
 Advances in technology have made it possible for employers to provide 
performance feedback to employees on a more frequent basis. This study investigates 
how different feedback frequencies can alter employees’ perceptions of time and 
subsequently how these altered perceptions influence employee productivity. I predict 
and find that feedback frequency alters the way employees break up or segment their 
work time—a process that I refer to as feedback-driven time segmenting. Ultimately I 
find that this process causes feedback frequency to have opposing effects on employee 
productivity. Specifically employees who receive more frequent feedback find fewer task 
efficiencies than employees who receive less frequent feedback. This finding represents 
an unintended cost of increasing feedback frequency—it can lead employees to be less 
likely to discover new and better ways of completing their work. However, I also find 
that employees who receive more frequent feedback work harder, if less efficiently, than 
employees who receive less frequent feedback. By examining both how hard employees 
work and how smart (i.e., efficiently) they work my study provides enhanced insight into 
the costs and benefits of increasing feedback frequency. As such, it helps managerial 
accountants fulfill one of their primary roles, understanding how performance 
information influences employee behavior.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Feedback frequency refers to how often managers decide to provide their 
employees with performance information over a given period of time (e.g., daily, weekly, 
monthly, quarterly, etc.). Recent technological advances have made it feasible for 
employers to provide more frequent performance feedback to their employees, and 
employers such as Amazon, Walmart, and General Electric are beginning to do so (Gillett 
2016; Darrow 2017; Dignan 2017).  However, it remains unclear whether employers 
should do so, in part because the effects of providing more frequent performance 
feedback are not well-documented (Andiola 2014). As such, I investigate how providing 
more frequent performance feedback affects employee behavior. In particular, I focus on 
two behaviors that are critical to determining employee performance, namely, (i) the 
propensity of employees to seek out new task efficiencies and (ii) the provision of 
productive effort.  
 Employees can increase productivity by finding new and better ways to complete 
work tasks (discovering task efficiencies) or by working harder using what they know 
(increasing productive effort). For example, employees working on a production task in a 
factory could seek out and experiment with different ways to arrange machinery so as to 
complete their work more efficiently or they could simply exert more effort using the 
current setup (Benjaafar et al. 2002; Schulz 2014). As another example, knowledge 
workers might adopt, modify, or create new software programs to increase their 
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efficiency or they may work harder using their current technology (Pentilla 2006; Myers 
et al. 2016).  
Surveys show that CEOs frequently list the discovery of task efficiencies as one 
of their top management challenges (Conference Board 2015; 2016; Sturt and Rogers 
2016). Employees can find it difficult to allocate effort away from their trusted, 
conventional work approaches towards the uncertain process of discovering new and 
better ways of getting work done. While a substantial amount of accounting research has 
examined how feedback influences employee effort (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; 2013; 
Newman and Tafkov 2014), little is known about how feedback influences the discovery 
of task efficiencies. This study expands our knowledge in this area by investigating how 
feedback frequency influences employee behavior in an environment in which employees 
must decide how to allocate their effort between getting work done and looking for better 
ways to get work done (i.e., looking for task efficiencies). As such, it helps managerial 
accountants fulfill one of their primary roles, understanding how performance 
information influences employee behavior (Hannan et al. 2013).  
I predict that providing more frequent performance feedback to employees has 
two opposing effects. First, I predict that it imposes a cost in that it decreases employees’ 
propensity to seek out task efficiencies. Second, I predict that it conveys a benefit in that 
it increases employees’ level of productive effort. In order to make these predictions, I 
draw upon research related to the psychology of time (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999; 
Grondin 2010). This research indicates that although physical time is an objective 
measure, how time is perceived and categorized is often subjective and malleable (e.g., 
Green 1995; Zimbardo and Boyd 1999; Hollander et al. 2005; Moran 2017). Based upon  
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this research, I develop theory that suggests that employees with the same work time 
horizon will create and focus on different sized time blocks or segments depending upon 
the frequency with which they receive feedback. For example, although one employee 
may view a year time horizon as twelve separate month-long segments, another employee 
may view the same time horizon as two six-month long segments. I expect that 
employees who receive more frequent feedback will create smaller time segments than 
those who receive less frequent feedback. I predict that this behavior—which I label 
feedback-driven time segmenting—affects employees in two ways. First, employees who 
create smaller time segments will perceive that they do not have time to explore and thus 
they will find fewer task efficiencies than employees who receive feedback less 
frequently. Second, employees with smaller time segments will feel a sense of urgency to 
produce and this will cause them to exert greater productive effort than employees who 
receive feedback less frequently.  
I test my predictions using an experiment in which participants assume the role of 
an employee whose job consists of finding how many times a “search letter” from the 
alphabet appears within a corresponding box of letters (adapted from Webb et al. 2013). 
Employees perform this letter-search task in an environment in which they can increase 
their productivity both by increasing their productive effort and by finding task 
efficiencies. The conventional approach for completing the task is to scan the rows and 
columns of the boxes and count the number of times the search letter appears. However, 
the task contains six hidden task efficiencies that can be discovered if employees are 
willing to depart from the conventional approach and instead spend time completing a 
decoding task that reveals the efficiencies. The task efficiencies include patterns in the 
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letters and boxes that make finding the number of times a letter appears much easier and 
quicker. Although participants are informed that implementing an efficiency is faster than 
the conventional approach, they are unaware of how long it will take to find the 
efficiencies and how beneficial the efficiencies will be, making it difficult for them to 
determine ex ante whether or not they should abandon the conventional approach. Within 
this setting, I manipulate how frequently participants receive performance feedback at 
two levels. In the More Frequent (Less Frequent) condition participants receive 
performance reports six times (two times) during an 18-minute work period.1 
Consistent with my predictions, I find that employees who receive more frequent 
feedback find fewer task efficiencies than employees who receive less frequent feedback. 
I also find that employees exert more productive effort when feedback is provided more 
frequently. Thus, my experimental results document the opposing effects of providing 
more frequent performance feedback on two key determinants of employee performance. 
Further, consistent with my theory, analysis of responses to a post-experimental 
questionnaire suggest that employees who receive more frequent performance feedback 
create and focus on smaller time segments than employees who receive less frequent 
feedback even though both sets of employees have the same amount of time to complete 
the task. Mediation analysis suggests that time segmenting mediates the relationships 
between both feedback frequency and productive effort and feedback frequency and the 
discovery of task efficiencies.  
                                                            
1 As discussed further in the method section, I investigate the effects of feedback frequency in an 
environment in which pay is not tied to the feedback employees receive. I do so in order to illustrate that 
feedback can have important consequences on employee behavior even when it does not influence 
compensation.  
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The results of my research contribute to both theory and practice. My study builds 
new feedback theory by introducing the notion of feedback-driven time segmenting and 
providing initial evidence in favor of this theory. Specifically my study shows that 
different feedback frequencies can alter employees’ mental time segmenting processes. 
Subsequently, I demonstrate that altering these mental processes can have important 
consequences on employee behavior. My study also contributes to theory and practice by 
examining the individual determinants of productivity, as opposed to simply looking at 
overall productivity. Examining individual determinants allows me to provide a more 
nuanced view of how feedback frequency affects performance. In so doing I provide a 
clearer picture of the costs and benefits of an organizational decision, which is a 
fundamental role of accounting (Balakrishnan et al. 2009).  
A better understanding of how feedback system design choices influence the 
individual determinants of productivity will help accountants as they make important 
practical decisions regarding their firms’ feedback systems. Although it is commonly 
believed that increasing feedback frequency is beneficial and many firms are beginning to 
provide feedback more frequently (Lam et al. 2011; Andiola 2014; Gillett 2016), I 
demonstrate that doing so can have a detrimental effect on a key determinant of 
productivity, efficiency finding. The results from my study suggest that because feedback 
frequency does not have unidirectional effects on the individual determinants of 
productivity there may be no universal recommendation for the frequency of feedback 
accountants should implement. Specifically, my results suggest that firms that want their 
employees to seek out potential task efficiencies may be best served by providing 
feedback less frequently. However, firms that are content with the efficiency of their 
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employees may benefit from increasing feedback frequency thereby increasing 
employees’ productive effort.  
My study contributes to two different areas of research. First, my study adds to 
the stream of literature on feedback frequency (e.g., Kluger and Denisi 1996; Lam et al. 
2011; Andiola 2014; Casas-Arce et al. 2017) by developing and testing a novel theory 
about how feedback frequency influences psychological processes that drive human 
behavior. Further, prior feedback research has provided mixed evidence regarding 
frequency’s effect on performance and indicates that a lack of theory has hindered our 
understanding in this area (Kluger and Denisi 1996; Casas-Arce et al. 2017). By delving 
into the individual determinants of performance, my study provides a more detailed view 
that helps explain why feedback frequency has been shown to have mixed effects on 
overall performance. 
My study also contributes to a new area of research that examines how 
management control tools can influence whether employees seek out task efficiencies 
(Webb et al. 2013). Webb et al. (2013) examine how financial incentives and challenging 
goals influence productive effort and the discovery of task efficiencies. I extend this area 
of research by investigating how managerial decisions about the performance feedback 
system influence these important determinants of employee productivity. 
The next chapter provides background information and develops the hypotheses. 
Chapter 3 discusses the experimental method used to test my hypotheses. Chapter 4 
reports the results, and Chapter 5 discusses these results and concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
I examine how feedback frequency influences employee behavior in a setting in 
which employees attempting to maximize their individual production must allocate their 
effort between using the conventional approach and seeking out task efficiencies. 
Research suggests that often in these settings employees must depart from their 
conventional approach in order to find efficiencies, and that these departures can cause a 
reduction in short-term performance (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). Prior research also 
indicates that constraints often exist in these settings, such as time pressure or limited 
mental resources, which can make it difficult for employees to abandon the relatively safe 
conventional approach in search of potential efficiencies (Shalley 1991; 1995). Finally, 
previous research suggests that, in these settings, simply finding the efficiency does not 
lead to increased productivity but that employees must direct productive effort towards 
using the efficiency in order to produce (Webb et al. 2013). Thus two employees with the 
same knowledge about efficiencies could have differences in output based on how much 
productive effort they exerted using those efficiencies. Within this setting, I develop 
hypotheses for how feedback frequency will influence the discovery of task efficiencies 
and productive effort. 
Effect of Feedback Frequency on Discovering Task Efficiencies 
Humans have an innate desire to divide or segment the continuous flow of time 
into quantifiable blocks in order to help them make sense of their environment and to 
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plan their behavior (e.g., Green 1995; Bentley 1996; Zimbardo and Boyd 1999; 
Hollander et al. 2005; Friedman 2014; Moran 2017). For example, managers often break 
time down into months, quarters, and years in order to make sense of their business 
environment and to plan their budgets and business goals (Garrison et al. 2012). I refer to 
the cognitive process of separating a continuous time horizon into discrete and 
quantifiable blocks of time as time segmenting.2 Importantly, the mental time segments 
that individuals create can exert a strong influence on an individual’s expectations, goals, 
and behaviors (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999).  
Individuals often use the time between important events when mentally 
categorizing a portion of time as a time segment (Green 1995; Bentley 1996; Zimbardo 
and Boyd 1999; Grondin 2010). For example, the block of time referred to as a “fiscal 
year” is the time between when a company issues the previous-year 10-K (an event) and 
the current-year 10-K (another event), and senior managers regularly use a fiscal-year 
time segment when planning their behavior and setting important goals at the company 
level (e.g., Garrison et al. 2012).3 At the employee level, receiving performance feedback 
is viewed as an important event (Cawley et al. 1998; Hochwarter et al. 2006; Dusterhoff 
et al. 2014). This suggests that employees will use the time between feedback events 
when mentally breaking up their employee time horizons into discrete, quantifiable 
blocks of time that they can use to plan and carry out their work. Thus, I expect that the 
frequency with which feedback is provided will alter the length of the mental time 
                                                            
2 Previous research discusses this process, but provides no clear label (e.g., Hollander et al. 2005; Grondin 
2010).  
3 Note that individuals can be influenced by multiple time segments. For example, a fiscal-year time 
segment may span a different period of time (e.g., April – March) than a calendar-year time segment (e.g., 
January – December), but managers’ behaviors and goals are influenced by both fiscal and calendar-year 
time segments (Garrison et al. 2012). Identifying whether certain types of time segments will have more or 
less influence on behavior than other types of time segments is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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segments employees create. Specifically, I expect that when performance feedback is 
given closer together, due to being provided on a more frequent basis, employees will 
create shorter mental time segments than when feedback is provided on a less frequent 
basis. For example, an employee who receives performance feedback on a monthly basis 
is more likely to view a one-year work horizon as twelve month-long segments than an 
employee who receives performance feedback semi-annually and is consequently more 
likely to perceive the same one-year work horizon as two six-month segments. Both 
employees have the same time horizon, but feedback frequency alters how they segment 
that time.  
 Although both the number and length of time segments can differ based on 
different feedback frequencies (as the example above demonstrates), I expect that it is the 
length of the time segments that will ultimately influence employee behavior. Individuals 
generally adopt a narrow decision frame and tend to evaluate projects, problems, and 
risks one at a time as opposed to in totality (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman 
and Lovallo 1993; Barberis et al. 2006). In my setting this suggests that instead of 
considering all of the time segments holistically, employees will instead focus narrowly 
on the current segment. If the current mental time segment is shorter (longer), then 
employees will perceive that they have less (more) room for seeking out and finding task 
efficiencies. Previous research indicates that having a perception that there is room to 
explore is an important precondition for discovering task efficiencies (Manso 2010; 
Ederer and Manso 2013). This suggests that employees who receive more frequent 
performance feedback and therefore potentially create shorter mental time segments, will 
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spend less time looking for and finding task efficiencies than employees who receive less 
frequent performance feedback and therefore potentially create longer time segments. 
The above discussion leads me to predict that employees who receive more 
frequent feedback will find fewer task efficiencies than employees who receive less 
frequent feedback. Although not formally hypothesized, I expect that differences in 
mental time segmenting will mediate the relationship between feedback frequency and 
efficiency finding.  
H1: Employees who receive more frequent feedback will discover fewer task 
efficiencies than employees who receive less frequent feedback.  
Effect of Feedback Frequency on Productive Effort 
Although finding task efficiencies is one way to improve employee productivity, 
productivity can also improve when employees work harder using the approaches and 
efficiencies they already know (i.e., by increasing productive effort). Importantly, even 
within an environment in which efficiencies exist, variation in productive effort can have 
important effects on overall productivity (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Webb et al. 2013). 
For example, consider two employees (Employee A and Employee B) who both know the 
same efficiency. If Employee A exerts higher productive effort using that efficiency than 
Employee B, then Employee A’s overall productivity will be higher than Employee B’s. 
Thus, productive effort is an important determinant of employee performance, even when 
efficiencies are present.  
As discussed above, my theory of feedback-driven time segmenting suggests that 
employees who receive more frequent feedback will create shorter mental time segments 
than employees who receive less frequent feedback. I anticipate that this difference in 
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time segmenting will alter employees’ productive effort. Specifically, I expect that 
employees with shorter time segments will exert greater productive effort than employees 
with longer time segments. Consistent with this prediction, prior research indicates that 
individuals have higher levels of motivation when they break up larger tasks into smaller 
components because they perceive the smaller components as more manageable (Heath et 
al. 1999; Amir and Ariely 2008). In my setting, employees who receive more frequent 
feedback may view the shorter time segments as more manageable, leading to higher 
motivation than employees facing longer time segments. Further, prior research suggests 
that when time is perceived to be relatively short, individuals can feel a sense of urgency 
that is often missing over longer time segments (Maruping et al. 2015).  
In summary I predict that employees who receive more frequent feedback will 
exert more productive effort than employees who receive less frequent feedback. 
Although not formally hypothesized, I expect that time segmenting mediates the 
relationship between feedback frequency and productive effort.  
H2: Employees who receive more frequent feedback will exert greater 
productive effort than employees who receive less frequent feedback.  
Because I expect feedback frequency to have opposing effects on two key 
determinants of productivity, I make no theoretical prediction about how frequency will 
influence overall performance. Further, theory provides no insight into which of the two 
determinants is more important to overall performance, likely because it depends upon 
the individual situation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
Participants 
I recruited 138 participants from business classes at a large public university in 
the United States. These students participated in one of 18 experimental sessions.4, 5 As 
participants arrived, they were randomly seated at a computer terminal which had 
instructions about the task they would be completing. This task is described in more 
detail below.  
Experimental Task 
Participants complete a letter search task adapted from Webb et al. (2013). As 
part of this task, participants receive multiple pages of paper that each contain six boxes 
of letters (each box has 7 rows and 19 columns of letters). Participants are tasked with 
finding the number of times a specific “search letter” appears within each box (see Figure 
3.1). The search letter appears in bold at the top-center of each of the boxes.  
After determining the number of times a search letter appears in its corresponding 
box, participants enter the response into a production spreadsheet on a computer (see 
Figure 3.2). When an incorrect answer is entered, a message box appears notifying the 
                                                            
4 One participant in the last session was dropped from the study leaving a total of 137 participants. This 
participant exhibited abnormal behavior consistent with being told about the experiment from peers and 
admitted to knowing about the purpose of the experiment in a subsequent discussion.  
5 As discussed in more detail in the supplemental analysis section, 65 of these students were used for 
testing the primary hypotheses regarding the effect of feedback frequency on finding efficiencies and 
productive effort. The remaining 72 participants were used to test whether the primary results were robust 
to different types of feedback (relative performance versus individual performance feedback). 
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participant that the answer is incorrect. This message box remains for five seconds during 
which time the participant is unable to enter answers into the spreadsheet. This five 
second delay deters participants from rapidly entering incorrect answers until they find 
the correct response. At the side of the production spreadsheet is a timer that notifies 
participants of the time remaining until they receive feedback from management.  
An important feature of this letter search task is that there is a conventional 
approach for completing the task, but it also has hidden shortcuts embedded within it that 
can be found if participants are willing to explore outside of the conventional approach. 
The conventional approach is to methodically scan the box and count the number of times 
a letter appears. While this approach is a reliable method for completing the task, there 
are six shortcuts built into the task that make finding the correct answer much more 
efficient. To find these shortcuts, participants must be willing to momentarily abandon 
the conventional approach and instead choose to explore a folder labeled “Shortcuts.” 
Participants are unaware of the exact contents of the shortcuts folder, representing the 
uncertainty that often accompanies the search for efficiencies in real work environments. 
Unbeknownst to the participants the folder contains six hidden messages that must be 
decoded in order to find the shortcuts (one message for each of the six shortcuts). In order 
to reveal the hidden message, participants had to decode a series of two-digit numbers 
into letters from the alphabet using a decoding key (See Figure 3.3 for a decoding 
example).  
There are six shortcuts (one for each of the six boxes) and a shortcut once 
discovered can be used on each subsequent page. Each shortcut involves a pattern that 
allows participants to find correct answers quickly. For example, the shortcut for Box 1 
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includes the following sequence (3, 5, 4, 9, 2) repeating itself. That is, the answer to Box 
1 on page one is three, on page two it is five, on page three it is four, on page four it is 
nine, on page five it is two and then the sequence repeats itself starting on page six. This 
same shortcut can be used on each of the twenty pages within the experiment. Thus, a 
participant could come up with the correct answer for Box 1 on every page by identifying 
this sequence and then simply entering the sequence into the production spreadsheet. 
Alternatively, the participant could use the conventional approach (scanning Box 1 and 
counting the number of times the search letter appears) to find the correct answer, which 
while slower does not require the participant to abandon the conventional approach and 
seek out the shortcut. For a complete list of the shortcuts see Figure 3.4. 
This task captures key features of the setting of interest. It models an environment 
in which participants must make a decision between continuing to do what they have 
always done and exploring for potential task efficiencies. Similar to many real world 
work environments, in this task the exploration process involves uncertainty about how 
long it will take to find an efficiency, whether the employee has the requisite skills to find 
an efficiency, and whether an efficiency will be worth the cost of finding it. Further, 
consistent with real world environments, in this task searching for efficiencies is 
generally harmful to short-term performance because it can require employees to 
momentarily abandon their productive conventional approach (Bonner and Sprinkle 
2002).  
Procedures 
Upon entering the lab, participants were seated at workstations that were labeled 
as either Employee A, Employee B, or Employee C. As discussed in more detail below 
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these labels were used for introductions and performance feedback purposes. After being 
seated at the workstations, participants received instructions on their computers that 
introduced them to the letter search task. These instructions were also read aloud to the 
participants. The instructions indicated that participants would complete a production 
task that started with a two-minute practice period and would subsequently be followed 
by an eighteen-minute main production period.  
After participants finished the practice period, they received instructions about the 
upcoming 18-minute production period. The instructions informed the participants that 
there were two ways to find the number of times a search letter appeared in a box. The 
first way was to use the conventional approach and simply count the number of times the 
letter appeared and the second way was to identify shortcuts.6 The instructions indicated 
that six shortcuts could be found (one for each of the six boxes) and that a shortcut, once 
discovered, could be used on each subsequent page. Participants were then instructed that 
if they chose to look for a shortcut while completing their work they could open a folder 
on their desk labeled “Shortcuts.” Participants were informed that this folder contained 
details for finding each of the six shortcuts, but otherwise remained unaware of the 
folder’s contents. The instructions then indicated that finding shortcuts could take away 
valuable time from productively completing boxes, but that using  a shortcut would be 
much faster than manually counting the number of times a letter appeared. Thus, 
participants faced a decision about how to allocate their efforts between a relatively 
                                                            
6 In the real world, employees will have more expertise about the tasks they complete and will have 
knowledge and insights about potential task efficiencies. In an abstract lab experiment with a task that they 
are not familiar with, participants are unlikely to know that efficiencies may exist unless they are told (i.e., 
they will assume that the experimenter did not design any efficiencies into the task unless they are told 
otherwise). Participants in all conditions are informed about the existence of shortcuts.  
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reliable strategy of counting letters and a relatively risky strategy that had the potential 
for increased efficiency—searching for shortcuts. After learning about the shortcuts 
folder, participants took a short questionnaire to measure their intrinsic interest in the 
letter search task.  
After the short questionnaire, participants were told to assume they worked for a 
company named Letter Counting Inc. They were informed that they had been paired with 
two other employees who would act as their co-workers throughout the experiment (e.g., 
If they sat at the workstation labeled Employee A, then they were paired with Employee 
B and Employee C). They were then told that Letter Counting Inc. would pay them a $10 
fixed wage for their work completing boxes. Using a fixed wage allowed me to cleanly 
isolate the behavioral effects of feedback frequency by holding economic predictions 
about wealth-maximizing behavior constant (Hannan et al. 2013; Tafkov 2013).7 
Next, participants were informed that Letter Counting Inc. would provide them 
with performance feedback that indicated how many boxes they had completed as well as 
how their performance compared to their co-workers. They were then told how 
frequently they would receive feedback and they were provided with more specifics 
about what the feedback entailed (discussed in more detail in the “Frequency Conditions” 
section below). At this point, participants took a short quiz to test their understanding of 
the instructions. After completing the quiz they each introduced themselves by standing 
and stating their employee label (Employee A, Employee B, or Employee C), their first 
name, and whether or not they were a business major. Each employee had a card on the 
                                                            
7 Further, non-performance based pay is commonly observed in the workplace, enhancing the 
generalizability of my study (Hannan et al. 2013). In addition, previous research provides evidence that 
fixed wage contracts create a better environment for finding task efficiencies than performance-based 
incentives (Amabile 1996; Webb et al. 2013).  
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top of their workstation that contained their employee label, which was visible to all other 
employees. The introductions were used in order to make the feedback more meaningful 
to the participants (Hannan et al. 2013; Tafkov 2013). Following the introductions, 
employees began the production period. After completing the production period, 
participants completed a post experimental questionnaire. Upon completing the 
questionnaire, participants were paid their $10 fixed wage. In total, participants were in 
the lab for a little under an hour.    
Frequency Conditions 
The frequency (Less Frequent vs More Frequent) of feedback was varied between 
conditions. Participants in the Less Frequent condition received performance reports two 
times during the production period (every nine minutes), whereas participants in the 
More Frequent condition received performance reports six times (every three minutes). 
This manipulation mirrors the real world in which managers can decide how often to 
provide performance feedback over a given period of time (Frederickson et al. 1999).  
The information participants received in a performance report can be seen in 
Figure 3.5. As Figure 3.5 illustrates, participants received a performance report from 
Letter Counting Inc. that indicated the number of boxes they had correctly completed 
since they last received feedback (or from the beginning of the production period in the 
first feedback instance). These reports also contained relative performance information 
that indicated employee rank (1st, 2nd, or 3rd) along with more detailed information about 
how many boxes each of the three employees completed since they last received 
feedback. I chose to use relative performance information (RPI) because previous 
research indicates that this type of feedback is commonly used by firms (Hannan et al. 
18 
2008; 2013; Newman and Tafkov 2014; Tafkov 2013; Burgers et al. 2015; Newman et al. 
2016). However, because RPI is a particularly salient type of feedback (due to the fact 
that it facilitates social comparison), in supplementary analysis I investigate whether my 
results are robust to situations in which feedback contains only individual performance 
information (i.e., in the absence of RPI).  
Dependent Variables 
 The primary dependent variables of interest were the number of shortcuts 
employees found and their productive effort. Participants received credit for finding a 
shortcut if they decoded the shortcut message and demonstrated that they understood the 
shortcut by using it. Participants demonstrated an understanding of the shortcut if the box 
corresponding to the shortcut was completed in less than 10 seconds multiple times. The 
amount of time it takes to complete a box and the order in which the boxes were 
completed was recorded electronically. The average time for completing a box without 
knowledge of a shortcut was 33 seconds. A large reduction in the amount of time it takes 
to complete a box, coupled with a completely decoded message, provided strong 
evidence that a shortcut had been identified. Next I discuss my measure of productive 
effort.  
In my setting, employee output is a function of both their productive effort and 
the number of shortcuts they find. Thus, to capture productive effort, I measured the total 
amount that each employee produced (total output) and divided that amount by one plus 
the number of shortcuts discovered (productive effort = total output/(1 + # of shortcuts)).8 
                                                            
8 By adding one to the number of shortcuts discovered I am able to retain the participants who did not find 
any shortcuts. These participants are important to retain as they represent the employees who go about their 
work without ever looking for efficiencies. Although these employees do not find any shortcuts they still 
exert considerable amounts of productive effort.  
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By dividing by one plus the number of shortcuts discovered I was able to control for 
productivity gains caused by knowing the shortcuts. In other words, controlling for the 
number of shortcuts known allowed for a clearer picture of how hard employees worked, 
as opposed to how smart they worked. Consistent with previous research I refer to this 
measure as employees’ productivity per shortcut (Webb et al. 2013).9  
Process Measures 
My theory suggests that how employees mentally segment time will influence the 
number of task efficiencies they find, with those employees who create smaller mental 
time segments perceiving that they have less room to find task efficiencies than 
employees who create larger time segments. I capture a measure of employees’ time 
segmenting process in the post-experiment questionnaire by asking them to respond to 
the following question on a seven-point scale: “While working did you think of your 
work in terms of:” Participants could respond to this question on a seven point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (three minute chunks) to 7 (an eighteen minute chunk).  
                                                            
9 In the results section I present an alternative measure for productive effort that provides results consistent 
with my productivity per shortcut measure.  
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FIGURE 3.1: Letter Search Task
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FIGURE 3.2: Production Spreadsheet
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FIGURE 3.3: Decoding Example  
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Box 1: The correct answer for this box follows the following sequence: three five four 
nine two repeated. 
Box 2: The correct answer for this box is always the number of consecutive G’s in the 
top row of the search box.  
Box 3: Adding the first two boxes together and subtracting one always provides the 
correct answer for this box.  
Box 4: The correct answer for this box is equal to the number of X’s in the far right 
column of the search box multiplied by the number two.  
Box 5: The correct answer for this box follows the following sequence: six eight four one 
four repeated. 
Box 6: Adding boxes four and five together and subtracting one always provides the 
correct answer for this box.    
 
FIGURE 3.4: List of Shortcuts
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FIGURE 3.5: Performance Feedback Screenshot  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics by Frequency condition. Panel A 
contains the mean number of Shortcuts that participants discovered and Panel B includes 
the mean Productivity per Shortcut discovered. As discussed above, by controlling for the 
number of Shortcuts known, differences in the Productivity per Shortcut between 
employees can be attributed to differences in the intensity of the productive effort being 
exerted.  
As reported in Table 4.1, Panel A employees who received less frequent feedback 
found, on average, more than double the amount of Shortcuts than employees who 
received more frequent feedback (mean = 1.39 versus 0.66). This pattern of results is 
consistent with H1. As reported in Table 4.1, Panel B employees who received more 
frequent feedback had, on average, directionally higher amounts of Productivity per 
Shortcut than employees who received less frequent feedback (mean = 30.54 versus 
22.94). This pattern of results is consistent with H2. Figure 4.1 plots the number of 
Shortcuts discovered by condition and the Productivity per Shortcut by condition. Figure 
4.1 illustrates that, as expected, feedback frequency appears to have opposing effects on 
efficiency finding and productive effort.  
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Hypotheses Testing – Feedback Frequency 
H1 predicts that employees who receive more frequent feedback will discover 
fewer shortcuts than employees who receive less frequent feedback. In order to test my 
hypothesis related to efficiency finding, I run an ANOVA with the number of Shortcuts 
discovered as the dependent variable and Frequency as the independent variable.10 The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.2, Panel A. As reported in Table 4.2, 
Panel A, H1 is supported (F = 3.95, P = 0.03, one-tailed). This result suggests that 
increasing feedback frequency has a detrimental effect on employees’ discovery of task 
efficiencies.  
H2 predicts that employees in the More Frequent condition will have higher 
levels of productive effort than employees in the Less Frequent condition. In order to test 
H2, I run an ANOVA with Productivity per Shortcut as the dependent variable and 
Frequency as the independent variable. As reported in Table 4.2, Panel B, H2 is 
supported (F = 6.67, P < 0.01, one-tailed). This results suggests that increasing feedback 
frequency helps motivate employees’ productive effort, causing them to increase their 
productivity by increasing the intensity of the effort directed towards the conventional 
approach and more efficient approaches that have previously been discovered. 
As a second measure of productive effort, I run an OLS regression to estimate the 
effect of frequency on output while controlling for the number of shortcuts known and 
the amount of time spent actually completing boxes (i.e., productive effort duration). By 
controlling for productive effort duration in addition to knowledge about shortcuts I am 
able to get a clearer picture of the intensity of the effort being employed. Specifically I 
                                                            
10 Non-parametric testing that is robust to violations of normality provide inferentially identical results.  
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run the following OLS regression:  Total Output = α + β1(Frequency Indicator Variable) 
+ β2(Shortcuts Discovered) + β3(Effort Duration) + ε. Further supporting H2, regression 
results indicate that frequency has a significantly positive effect on productive effort (β1 = 
4.74, P = 0.02, one-tailed, untabulated).  
The theory underlying H1 and H2 is that differences in feedback frequency can 
lead to differences in how employees categorize or segment time. I capture the length of 
participants’ time segments in the post-experiment questionnaire. Specifically, employees 
were asked about the length of the chunks of time they focused on while working. 
Participants responded to this question using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (three 
minute chunks) to 7 (an eighteen minute chunk). Those employees in the More Frequent 
condition focused on significantly smaller chunks of time than employees in the Less 
Frequent condition (average responses of 1.44 versus 3.91, P < 0.01, one-tailed). 
Although all employees have the same work time horizon of 18 minutes, the frequency in 
which the feedback is provided appears to alter how employees segment time. Employees 
in the More Frequent condition appeared to perceive their 18 minute work horizon as 
something approaching six 3-minute segments whereas employees in the Less Frequent 
condition appeared to perceive their 18 minute work horizon as something approaching 
two 9-minute segments. This result suggests that feedback frequency can alter how 
employees segment time. Next, I use mediation analysis (Hayes 2013) to examine 
whether this difference in mental time segmenting ultimately influences employee 
behavior.11 
                                                            
11 Results for all mediation analyses are inferentially identical using the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach.  
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I develop a model to test whether Time Segmenting mediates the relationship 
between feedback Frequency and the number of Shortcuts employees discover. For a 
visual representation of this model see Figure 4.2, Panel A. I compute a 95% bootstrap 
confidence interval based on 5,000 bootstrap samples to test whether the indirect path 
through Time Segmenting is statistically significant. The 95% confidence interval lies 
entirely below zero        (-0.06 to -1.75) indicating that Time Segmenting significantly 
mediates the negative effect of feedback Frequency on number of Shortcuts discovered. 
This result suggests that increasing feedback frequency can cause employees to create 
smaller mental time segments which subsequently leads employees to find fewer task 
efficiencies. 
Next, I use mediation analysis to test whether Time Segmenting also mediates the 
relationship between feedback Frequency and productive effort as measured by 
Productivity per Shortcut. For a visual representation of this model see Figure 4.2, Panel 
B. Using the same bootstrap technique as above I find that the 95% confidence interval 
lies entirely above zero (1.17 to 10.01) indicating that Time Segmenting significantly 
mediates the positive relationship between feedback Frequency and Productivity per 
Shortcut. This result suggests that although mentally creating smaller time segments can 
have a detrimental effect on efficiency finding, it appears to benefit employees’ 
productive effort. Taken together my results demonstrate that differences in time 
segmenting can have important effects on employee behavior.  
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Supplementary Analysis 
Type of Feedback  
Although not the primary focus of the study I also examine different types of 
performance feedback (individual feedback and relative performance information (RPI)) 
for two reasons. The first reason is to test whether my documented results are robust to 
different types of feedback. As mentioned in the method section, I chose to use RPI as the 
type of feedback that I provided to employees. However, because RPI is a particularly 
strong form of feedback that facilitates social comparisons (Hannan et al. 2008; 2013), I 
also vary feedback frequency using a relatively weak form of feedback—individual 
feedback that simply sums up the number of boxes an employee completed. The second 
reason for investigating feedback type is to examine its independent effect on the 
discovery of task efficiencies. While previous research has examined how RPI influences 
effort (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008, 2013 Tafkov 2013; Newman and Tafkov 2014), it has yet 
to examine how RPI influences the discovery of task efficiencies.  
 To test the effects of feedback type I used the same letter search task with 
shortcuts described above. I also recruited participants from the same pool of students 
and used the same feedback frequency variations as described above (six times versus 
two times).  The procedures and instructions were identical with one exception—the type 
of performance feedback participants received (RPI versus No RPI). As discussed earlier, 
participants in the RPI conditions received information about their individual 
performance along with information about how their performance compared to two co-
workers with whom they had been paired. In the No RPI conditions, participants simply 
received a summary of their individual performance, or the number of boxes they had 
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completed (see Figure 4.3). Next I present the findings for whether my previous results 
are robust to different types of feedback.   
Type of Feedback - Results 
Table 4.3 reports the descriptive statistics for how feedback frequency affects the 
No RPI conditions. Panel A demonstrates that, on average, employees who received more 
frequent feedback found fewer than half the number of Shortcuts than employees who 
received less frequent feedback (mean = 1.00 versus 2.06). This difference is statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.01, one-tailed, untabulated), indicating that increasing feedback 
frequency can cause employees to find fewer efficiencies even when the feedback being 
provided is relatively inconspicuous (a simple summary of output with no comparative 
features). This provides evidence that my results regarding how feedback frequency 
influences efficiency finding are robust to different types of feedback. Consistent with 
robustness, untabulated analysis indicates that there is no significant interaction between 
feedback frequency and feedback type on the number of Shortcuts found (p-value = 0.58, 
two-tailed).  
Table 4.3, Panel B reports that, on average, employees in the No RPI conditions 
who received more frequent feedback had higher levels of Productivity per Shortcut than 
employees who received less frequent feedback (mean = 30.07 versus 22.62). This 
difference is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01, one-tailed, untabulated). Thus, 
increasing feedback frequency appears to lead to higher productive effort even when the 
feedback is a simple summary of output. Here again I find that my results are robust to 
different types of feedback. Consistent with being robust, untabulated analysis suggests 
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that there is no significant interaction between feedback frequency and feedback type on 
Productivity per Shortcut (p-value = 0.97, two-tailed).  
As mentioned above, previous research has examined how RPI influences effort 
(e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; 2013), but it has yet to examine how it affects the discovery of 
task efficiencies. Because there is no significant interaction between feedback frequency 
and feedback type I collapse across frequency conditions to examine the independent 
effect of RPI on the number of Shortcuts found.12 My results indicate that, on average, 
those employees who received RPI found fewer shortcuts than those employees who did 
not (mean = 1.03 versus 1.53, p-value = 0.09, two-tailed, untabulated). This suggests that 
providing RPI can have a detrimental effect on the number of efficiencies employees 
find. Next I discuss potential reasons for this finding.  
Previous research and questions about social image concerns in the post-
experimental questionnaire provide potential insights into why RPI caused employees to 
find fewer efficiencies than individual performance information. Previous social 
psychology research suggests that concerns about social image and avoiding social losses 
may cause employees to avoid taking risks that could potentially cause them to look bad 
to their peers (Loewenstein et al. 1989; Camerer 1998; Lim 2010). In my setting, being 
risk averse would mean using the conventional approach as opposed to the riskier option 
of seeking out unknown task efficiencies. Thus, it may be the case that providing RPI 
heightened employees’ social image concerns, leading them to use a conventional 
approach more often than employees who did not receive RPI. In order to test this 
explanation, I asked participants in a post-experiment questionnaire several questions 
                                                            
12 Using the full model with the interaction term leads to inferentially identical results.  
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about their concerns regarding social image and social losses. Specifically I asked 
employees to report on a seven point scale how often they thought about their 
performance compared to other participants (Rank Thinking); how nervous or concerned 
they were about how well they were performing relative to other participants (Rank 
Nervousness); the extent to which thinking about how their performance compared to 
other participants interfered with their ability to concentrate on the task (Rank 
Interference) and how much they worried about the possibility of performing worse than 
other people in the study (Social Loss Concern).  
Table 4.4 provides results for the four different questions I asked with regards to 
rankings and social losses. As reported in Table 4.4, employees who received RPI had 
significantly higher levels of Rank Thinking, Rank Nervousness, Rank Interference, and 
Social Loss Concern than employees who did not receive RPI (all p-values < 0.05).13 
These results are consistent with the explanation that RPI can cause employees to worry 
about their social image and exhibit risk averse behaviors to avoid social losses.   
In summary, supplemental analysis suggests that my documented results 
regarding how feedback frequency influences time segmenting, productive effort, and 
efficiency finding are robust to different types of feedback. Additionally, I find that 
employees who receive RPI find fewer task efficiencies than employees who only receive 
individual performance feedback. Next I discuss my results with regards to the relation 
between feedback frequency and overall performance.  
 
 
                                                            
13 Creating a single social image concern factor using these four questions (eigenvalue = 2.479, percentage 
of variance explained = 61.98%) and testing for differences using this factor leads to identical results.  
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Overall Performance 
Predicting how feedback frequency influences overall performance is challenging 
for two reasons: First, my results demonstrate that feedback frequency can have opposing 
effects on two key determinants of performance, productive effort and efficiency finding. 
Second, theory does not provide insights into which of the two will have a larger effect 
on overall performance, likely because it depends upon the individual situation and the 
timeline being evaluated. For these reasons I make no formal prediction about how 
feedback frequency affects overall output or the total number of boxes completed.  
Although I have no formal prediction regarding overall output, observing how 
patterns of output vary over time across the frequency conditions can be insightful. For 
example, one might expect that employees in the Less Frequent conditions would have 
dips in productivity as they seek out efficiencies, followed by bursts in productivity as 
efficiencies are discovered. In contrast, employees in the More Frequent conditions 
would likely have steady output as they continue working hard using the work 
approaches they already know. Figure 4.4 breaks the eighteen-minute production period 
into three minute periods of time and plots the average amount of work completed during 
each of those three-minute periods by Frequency condition. As Figure 4.4 demonstrates, 
the performance of employees who received feedback less frequently seems erratic when 
compared to the smoother performance of those employees who received feedback more 
frequently.  
Interestingly, the erratic behavior of employees in the Less Frequent condition led 
to higher levels of average total output than the smoothing behavior of employees in the 
More Frequent condition within my experimental setting (48.36 versus 42.85, P = 0.096, 
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two-tailed, untabulated). This finding is consistent with the growing notion that firms 
would likely benefit from greater tolerance towards employees’ short-term failures and 
an increased emphasis on employees’ long-term performance (Manso 2010; Ederer and 
Manso 2013). However, caution should be taken when generalizing findings about total 
output from my experimental setting to all work settings as the level of benefit derived 
from finding efficiencies will likely vary from organization to organization. That is, it 
could be the case that in some environments the gains from having employees seek out 
efficiencies are not worth the losses in productive effort.
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TABLE 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Means (Standard Errors) for Shortcuts Found 
Less Frequent More Frequent Average 
1.39 
(0.29) 
n = 33 
.66 
(0.28) 
n = 32 
1.03 
(0.21) 
n = 65 
 
Panel B: Means (Standard Errors) for Productivity Per Shortcut 
Less Frequent More Frequent Average 
22.94 
(2.04) 
n = 33 
30.54 
(2.07) 
n = 32 
26.68 
(1.46) 
n = 65 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Shortcuts refers to the number of shortcuts employees discover.  
Productivity per Shortcut refers to the number of boxes employees complete while 
controlling for the number of shortcuts known. It is calculated as follows: the number 
of boxes completed / (1 + the number of shortcuts known).  
In the Less Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback that includes 
RPI every nine minutes. In the More Frequent conditions participants receive 
performance feedback that includes RPI every three minutes.  
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TABLE 4.2: Test of Hypothesis H1 and Test of Hypothesis H2 
                                           Test of Hypothesis H1 
Panel A: Analysis of Variance for Shortcuts Found 
Factor df Sum of Squares F P-Value
 a 
Frequency 1 8.84 3.95 0.03 
Error 63    
 
                                           Test of Hypothesis H2 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance for Productivity Per Shortcut 
Factor df Sum of Squares F P-Value
 a 
Frequency 1 938.18 6.67 <0.01 
Error 63    
 
a Bolded p-values are one-tailed.  
Variable Definitions: 
Shortcuts refers to the number of shortcuts employees discover.  
Productivity per Shortcut refers to the number of boxes employees complete while 
controlling for the number of shortcuts known. It is calculated as follows: the number 
of boxes completed / (1 + the number of shortcuts known).  
Feedback Frequency is a between-subjects manipulated variable: In the Less Frequent 
conditions participants receive performance feedback that includes RPI every nine 
minutes. In the More Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback 
that includes RPI every three minutes.  
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TABLE 4.3: Descriptive Statistics – No RPI Conditions 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard Errors) for Shortcuts Found 
Less Frequent More Frequent Average 
2.06 
(0.32) 
n = 36 
1.00 
(0.28) 
n = 36 
1.53 
(0.20) 
n = 72 
 
Panel B: Means (Standard Errors) Productivity Per Shortcut 
Less Frequent More Frequent Average 
22.62 
(1.96) 
n = 36 
30.07 
(1.96) 
n = 36 
26.34 
(1.38) 
n = 72 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Shortcuts refers to the number of shortcuts employees discover.  
Productivity per Shortcut refers to the number of boxes employees complete while 
controlling for the number of shortcuts known. It is calculated as follows: the number 
of boxes completed / (1 + the number of shortcuts known).  
In the Less Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback every nine 
minutes. In the More Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback 
every three minutes.  
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TABLE 4.4: Rank Thinking and Social Loss Aversion Questions 
Mean (Standard Error) 
 No RPI RPI P-Value a 
Rank Thinking 3.97 (0.17) 
4.51 
(0.18) 0.02 
Rank Nervousness 3.53 (0.21) 
4.05 
(0.22) 0.04 
Rank Interference 2.57 (0.19) 
3.11 
(0.20) 0.03 
Social Loss Concern 4.43 (0.18) 
5.15 
(0.19) <0.01 
 
a Bolded values are one-tailed.  
Variable Definitions:  
Rank Thinking represents employees’ responses to the following question on a seven 
point scale: “How often did you think about how your performance compared to the 
performance of other participants?” (1 = Never, 4 = Sometimes, 7 = Very Often).  
Rank Nervousness represents employees’ responses to the following question on a seven 
point scale: “How nervous or concerned were you about how well you were 
performing relative to other participants?” (1 = Not at all nervous or concerned, 4 = 
Somewhat nervous or concerned, 7 = Very nervous or concerned).  
Rank Interference represents employees’ responses to the following question on a seven 
point scale: “To what extent did thinking about how your performance compared to 
those of other participants interfere with your ability to concentrate on the task?” (1 = 
Not at all, 4 = To a moderate extent, 7 = To a great extent).  
Social Loss Concern represents employees’ responses to the following statement on a 
seven point scale: “When I worked on the letter search task, I worried about the 
possibility of performing worse than other people in this study.” (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor disagree, 7 = Strongly agree).  
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Variable Definitions: 
Shortcuts refers to the number of shortcuts employees discover.  
Productivity per Shortcut refers to the number of boxes employees complete while 
controlling for the number of shortcuts known. It is calculated as follows: the number 
of boxes completed / (1 + the number of shortcuts known).  
In the Less Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback every nine 
minutes. In the More Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback 
every three minutes.   
Efficiency Finding Productive Effort 
FIGURE 4.1: Efficiency Finding and Productive Effort by Condition 
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Panel A: Shortcuts Discovered Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Productivity per Shortcut Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2: Mediation Model 
Variable Definitions: 
Feedback Frequency is a between-subjects manipulated variable: In the Less Frequent 
conditions participants receive performance feedback every nine minutes. In the More 
Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback every three minutes.  
Time Segmenting represents participants responses to the following question: “While 
working did you think of your work in terms of:” (1-7) 1 = three minute chunks, 4 = 
nine minute chunks, and 7 = an eighteen minute chunk.  
Shortcuts refers to the number of shortcuts employees discover.  
Productivity per Shortcut refers to the number of boxes employees complete while 
controlling for the number of shortcuts known. It is calculated as follows: the number 
of boxes completed / (1 + the number of shortcuts known). 
Shortcuts 
Discovered 
Time 
Segmenting 
Feedback 
Frequency 
Productivity 
per Shortcut 
Time 
Segmenting 
Feedback 
Frequency 
α = -2.47 
P < 0.01 
β = 0.37 
P < 0.01 
C’ = 0.17 
P = 0.72 
α = -2.47 
P < 0.01 
β = -2.15 
P = 0.02 
C’ = 2.30 
P = 0.56 
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FIGURE 4.3: Performance Feedback Screenshot – No RPI 
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Variable Definitions: 
Average Output represents the average number of boxes completed correctly by 
employees during a three minute interval.  
In the Less Frequent condition participants receive performance feedback every nine 
minutes. In the More Frequent condition participants receive performance feedback 
every three minutes.  
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FIGURE 4.4: Average Output per Three Minute Time Interval 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how feedback frequency 
can influence two key determinants of employee productivity—productive effort and the 
discovery of task efficiencies. My results demonstrate that employees who receive more 
frequent feedback find fewer task efficiencies than employees who receive less frequent 
feedback. I also find that employees who receive more frequent feedback exert more 
productive effort than employees who receive less frequent feedback. Thus, my 
experimental results document the opposing effects of providing more frequent 
performance feedback on two key determinants of employee performance. My results 
also provide theory confirming evidence for why feedback frequency has these effects. 
Specifically, feedback frequency appears to significantly alter how employees segment 
their time and mediation analysis suggests that time segmenting mediates the 
relationships between both feedback frequency and productive effort and feedback 
frequency and the discovery of task efficiencies. 
 Although not the primary focus of the study, supplementary results indicate that 
my predicted effects are robust to different types of feedback, including stronger forms of 
feedback such as RPI and weaker forms of feedback such as individual performance 
information that simply summarizes an individual’s output. These supplementary results 
also indicate that employees who receive RPI find fewer task efficiencies than employees 
who only receive individual performance information. Results from the post-
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experimental questionnaire suggest that providing RPI may lead employees to avoid risks 
that could lead to social losses. 
The results of my study inform both theory and practice. My study builds new 
theory related to performance feedback by introducing the notion of feedback-driven time 
segmenting and providing initial evidence in favor of this theory. Specifically my study 
shows that different feedback frequencies can alter employees’ mental time segmenting 
processes. I also demonstrate that feedback-driven time segmenting can have important 
consequences on employees’ productive effort and efficiency finding—two key 
determinants of employee productivity. Additionally, by examining the individual 
determinants of productivity, as opposed to simply looking at overall output, my results 
provide a more intricate view of how feedback frequency affects performance. In so 
doing I provide enhanced insight into the costs and benefits of an important 
organizational decision.  
A better understanding of how feedback frequency affects the individual 
determinants of employee productivity will help managers who are considering 
increasing feedback frequency because of advances in feedback technology.  Although 
many firms are beginning to provide feedback more frequently (e.g., Gillett 2016; 
Darrow 2017; Dignan 2017), I demonstrate that doing so may have the unintended 
consequence of reducing the number of task efficiencies employees discover. Thus, 
managers who want their employees to seek out potential task efficiencies may be best 
served by providing performance feedback less frequently. However, increasing feedback 
frequency does appear to motivate higher levels of productive effort, suggesting that 
managers who are satisfied with the efficiency of their employees’ work processes may 
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benefit from increasing performance feedback frequency. Taken together these results 
suggest that because feedback frequency can have opposing effects on the individual 
determinants of productivity there may be no general recommendation for the frequency 
of feedback accountants should implement. Instead the decision will depend in part upon 
whether managers want more efficiency or more productive effort. Additionally, my 
supplemental results regarding feedback type indicate that managers who want their 
employees to find more efficiencies may be best served by avoiding RPI and instead 
providing individual feedback that does not cause employees to be concerned about 
looking bad to their co-workers.  
My study contributes to three different areas of research. First, my study 
contributes to the stream of literature on feedback frequency (e.g., Kluger and Denisi 
1996; Frederickson et al. 1999; Lam et al. 2011; Andiola 2014; Casas-Arce et al. 2017) in 
two ways. I add to this literature by developing and testing the theory of feedback-driven 
time segmenting and demonstrating how it influences employee behavior. I also 
contribute to this literature by documenting the opposing effects of feedback frequency 
on two determinants of overall performance. By so doing, my study helps explain why 
previous research has found mixed evidence regarding the effect of feedback frequency 
on overall performance (e.g., Kluger and Denisi 1996; Casas-Arce et al. 2017).  
Second, my study extends the accounting literature on RPI. Previous research in 
this area has examined how RPI affects employees’ productive effort (e.g., Hannan et al. 
2008; 2013; Newman and Tafkov 2014), but has yet to examine its influence on the 
discovery of task efficiencies. While previous research has shown that RPI has a positive 
effect on performance in fixed-wage and piece-rate environments (Tafkov 2013), my 
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study illustrates that this positive effect may come at the cost of discovering task 
efficiencies that could prove useful to the firm in the long run. Third, my study 
contributes to a new area of research that examines how managerial controls can 
influence productivity in an environment in which employees can improve productivity 
by increasing productive effort and by finding task efficiencies (Webb et al. 2013). I 
build upon Webb et al. (2013), who focus on financial incentives and goals, by 
examining the effects of different feedback frequencies and types within this important 
setting.  
  My study suggests several avenues for future research. While this study focuses 
on the effects of feedback frequency on employee time segmenting, future research could 
investigate whether other organizational factors interact with feedback frequency to affect 
or independently affect time segmenting. For example, prior feedback research has 
examined both formal feedback and informal feedback (Dezoort et al. 2006; Kadous et al. 
2013; Andiola 2014). In my study feedback was relatively formal as participants knew 
when they would receive feedback and the feedback came in the form of a performance 
report. In certain circumstances managers or other colleagues may provide informal 
feedback verbally to an employee. Future research could investigate whether these types 
of informal feedback are less likely to influence employee time segmenting processes. 
Another interesting avenue for future research would be to examine whether the feedback 
contains information about the number of efficiencies found in addition to employee 
output. This may be a potential intervention that would allow managers to provide 
feedback on a more frequent basis without the accompanying negative effects of 
decreased efficiency finding. Compensation timing is another organizational factor that 
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seems likely to influence time segmenting. Employees who are paid weekly may break 
up their work horizons differently than employees who are paid bi-weekly or monthly. 
Future research could investigate how compensation design choices influence time 
segmenting and whether compensation choices interact with feedback choices to 
influence the segmenting process.  
With regards to RPI, opportunities for future research exist. For example, 
gamification—as a way of motivating employees to increase productivity—is becoming 
increasing popular and many types of gamification include RPI as a way of making the 
game competitive (Silverman 2011; Manjoo 2014). It would be interesting to examine 
whether “gamifying” RPI or making it more “fun” would alleviate the negative effects of 
RPI on discovering task efficiencies. Additionally, previous research has studied several 
different types of RPI (e.g., public versus private, cumulative versus reset, rank versus 
detailed) (Hannan et al. 2008; 2013; Tafkov 2013). Future research can examine whether 
these variations in RPI reporting have an impact on productive effort and the discovery of 
task efficiencies.  
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